volume	14,	no.	32 november	2014 Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason Owen Ware Simon Fraser University © 2014 Owen	Ware This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/014032/> I dare speak confidently and positively of very few things, except of matters of fact. - Boyle ("A Pröemial Essay", I, 307). We have at hand examples of reason judging morally. We can analyze them into their elementary concepts and, in default of mathematics, adopt a procedure similar to that of chemistry - the separation, by repeated experiments on common human understanding, of the empirical from the rational that may be found in them. - Kant (KpV, AA 5:163). Introduction According	to	a	popular	reading,	Kant's	aim	in	the	final	section	of	the Groundwork (1785)	was	staggeringly	ambitious.	He	was	seeking	a	nonmoral	premise that	would	ground	our status as free agents, and	he wanted to use this premise to show	why the	moral law is unconditionally	valid.	But	in	the	second	Critique	(1788),	the	reading	continues, Kant	backed	away	from	this	strategy.	He	concluded	that	the	moral	law "cannot	be	proved	by	any	deduction",	although	our	consciousness	of	its authority	may	be	called	a	"Fact	of	Reason"	(Faktum der Vernunft)	(KpV, AA	5:47,	5:31).	Incredibly,	Kant	then	appealed	to	this	alleged	"fact"	to justify	our	status	as free	agents,	effectively	arguing from	morality to freedom,	rather	than	from	freedom	to	morality.	Unfortunately	for	Kant, this reversal is	widely considered an abysmal failure, amounting to what	some	have	called	"foot-stomping"	and	"moralistic	bluster".1 1. The	first	expression	is	from	Paul	Guyer,	"Naturalistic	and	Transcendental	Moments",	462;	the	second	is	from	Allen	Wood,	Kantian Ethics,	135.	Similarly,	in Karl	Ameriks's	view	only	"some	technical	peculiarities"	prevent	us	from	labeling	Kant's	position	in	the	second	Critique	"fundamentally	intuitionistic"	and	to this	extent	"he	can	be	said	to	have	encouraged	the	return,	at	least	in	Germany, to a kind of dogmatic	metaphysics" (Kant's Theory of Mind, 218–219). Schopenhauer	drew this verdict long ago	-	and in less	flattering terms	-	when he	wrote	that	Kant's	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Reason	opened	a	"gateway"	for	all "philosophasters	and	phantasists"	to	bring	forth	their	spurious	theories	(citing the	work	of	Jacobi,	Reinhold,	Fichte,	and	Schelling)	(Grundlage,	III.	674). ImprintPhilosophers' o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) chemist",	he	means	we	can	set	up	thought	experiments	that	illustrate the	way	we	separate	duty	from	happiness.	This	provides	a	key	for	explaining	why	Kant's	appeal	to	moral	consciousness	in	the	second	Critique	is	not	dogmatic,	contrary	to	a	prevailing	view	in	the	secondary	literature.	Another	payoff	to	my	reading,	which	I	will	discuss	in	the	final section,	is	that	it	shows	why	Kant's	strategy	of	justification	shifts	focus from	the	theoretical	standpoint	we	adopt	as	philosophers	toward	the practical	standpoint	we	adopt	as	ordinary	persons.	It	is	only	when	we philosophize from	a	practical,	first-personal	perspective that	we	can understand	what	common	reason	already	knows	"in	its	heart".	Once we	grasp	this,	I	believe,	we	shall	see	why	Kant's	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of Reason	is	of	lasting	philosophical	value.4 1. A History of "Fact" In	the	Romano-canon	tradition,	matters	of	fact	pertained	to	a	sphere distinct	from	matters	of	law,	as	expressed	by	the	maxim:	"Da mihi facto dabo tibi ius"	("You	give	me	the	facts,	I	give	you	the	law"),	from	Quintilian's Institutes of the Orator.5	The	first	entry	in	the	Oxford English Dictionary	also	defines	matters	of	fact	as	"that	portion	of	a	subject	of	judicial inquiry	which	is	concerned	with	the	truth	or	falsehood	of	alleged	facts", citing	its	first	record	in	English	from	1583	("He	speaketh	of	a	matter	of fact",	by	Nowell	and	Day).	During	the	Restoration	era,	"facts"	came	to 4. From this introductory sketch,	my	position	may	appear to	be	at	odds	with commentators	who	read	the	Fact	of	Reason	as	a	kind	of	"act"	or	"deed",	drawing	from	Kant's	remark	that	pure	reason	"proves	its	reality	and	that	of	its	concepts	by	what	it	does	[durch die Tat]"	(KpV,	AA	5:3).	See,	for	example,	Willaschek	("Die	Tat	der	Vernunft"),	Engstrom	("Introduction"),	and	Franks	(All or Nothing).	Nevertheless,	I	believe	we	can	reconcile	these	readings	if	we	maintain	that	moral	consciousness	only	arises	through	an	original	act	of	reason's self-determination.	This	would	still	make	moral	consciousness	the	primary	referent	of	Kant's	Faktum,	but	it	would	preserve	the	important	insight	by	Willaschek,	Engstrom,	and	Franks	that	the	moral	law	is	one	we	actively	give	to	ourselves.	Moreover,	the	scientific	sense	of	"fact"	I	shall	uncover	from	the	work of	Boyle	and	others	is	consistent	with	the	"deed	of	reason"	interpretation,	for the	whole	enterprise	of	producing	and	reproducing	natural	phenomena	via experiment	has	an	active	character.	Thanks	to	two	reviewers	of	this	journal for	pressing	me	to	clarify	these	issues. 5. Cited	in	Shapiro,	Culture of Fact,	9. In	this	paper,	my	aim	is	to	offer	a	more	charitable	reading	of	Kant's strategy	of	justification	in	the	second	Critique.2	I	will	do	so,	however, by taking	what	may seem to be an unlikely detour:	working from the traditions of Romano-canon and English common law; to the works of the British experimentalists in the seventeenth century; and	finally, to the	German	translation	of	Bishop	Butler's	Analogy of Religion	in	1756.	While	my	ultimate	concern	here	is	to	defend	a	new systematic	reading	of	Kant's	Faktum	(sections	3–4),	I	believe	that	tracing the	history	of "fact" through these	phases is necessary for putting	his argument in its	proper context (sections 1–2).	As	we shall see,	Kant's	Faktum	shares	the	meaning	of	a	"matter	of	fact"	(Tatsache),3 referring to the reality	of	our	moral consciousness; and like	a "Tatsache",	it	is	something	we	can	attest	to	with	the	aid	of	Kant's	thought experiments.	Later	on	I	will	address	a	few	possible	objections	to	this reading	(sections	5–6),	one	of	which	I	anticipate	coming	from	Dieter Henrich	and	Ian	Proops,	who	have	argued	that	Kant's	Faktum	is	best understood	under	a	legal	analogy. The	reading	I	wish	to	defend	in	this	paper	has	two	significant	payoffs.	One is that it shows	why	Kant's	mysterious allusions to chemistry in the second	Critique are	of central importance (KpV	AA	5:92; cf. 5:163).	When Kant says a philosopher has an advantage "like a 2. The	question	of	whether	Kant	changed	his	strategy	of	justification	by	the	time he	wrote	the	second	Critique lies	beyond	the	scope	of this	paper.	For	advocates	of	a	reversal	reading,	see	Beck,	Commentary;	Ameriks,	"Kant's	Deduction of	Freedom	and	Morality";	Korsgaard,	"Morality	as	Freedom";	Rawls,	"Themes in	Kant's	Moral	Philosophy";	Allison,	Kant's Theory of Freedom;	Łuków,	"Kant's Passage	to	Ordinary	Moral	Knowledge";	Sussman,	"Kant's	Grounding	of	the Moral	Law";	and	Timmermann,	"Reversal	or	Retreat?".	For	advocates	of	a	continuity	reading,	see	Henrich,	"Faktum	der	Vernunft",	Tenenbaum,	"The	Idea of	Freedom	and	Moral	Cognition	in	Groundwork	III",	and	Wood,	"Preface	and Introduction	(3–16)". 3. I	am	not	the	first	to	read	the	Fact	of	Reason	as	a	kind	of	Tatsache	(see,	e. g.,	Reinhold,	Beyträge,	Cohen,	Kants Begründung,	and	Kleingeld,	"Moral	Consciousness"). Yet to	my knowledge no one has investigated the	Faktum/Tatsache connection	through	the	history	of	"fact".	As	we	shall	see,	while	Kant's	Faktum does	not	admit	of	proof	by	deduction,	it	admits	of	illustration	by	experiment. For	indications	of	where	my	reading	overlaps	with	or	diverges	from	existing accounts	in	the	secondary	literature,	see	notes	4,	23,	25,	and	26	below. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) of	certainty	found	in	logic	or	mathematics	was	no	longer	a	plausible goal.9	In	many	ways	advocates	of	the	experimental	method	wanted	to rethink	proof	and	certainty	according	to	an	increasingly	modest	framework	of	explanation.	Boyle,	for	example,	did	not	claim	to	understand the	causal	mechanism	of	air	through	his	experiments.	Rather,	he	only claimed	to	witness	its	effects	through	the	technology	of	the	air-pump. This	shift	was	essential	for	members	of	the	Royal	Society	who	wanted to	secure	a	foundation	of	probable	knowledge	while	avoiding	contentious	issues	about	causality.10 By	the	time	Locke	wrote	his	Essay	at	the	close	of	the	seventeenth century, this new	way of thinking	was common currency. Yet there is	no	question	that	Locke	contributed	to	this	shift	by	raising	the	concept	of	"fact"	to	a	philosophical	category.	In	the	chapter	of	the	Essay devoted to	degrees	of assent, Locke identified	a	matter	of fact	with "some	particular	Existence"	capable	of	observation	and	testimony,	allowing	us to "reason and act thereupon	with as little doubt, as if it were	perfect	demonstration"	(E,	IV.xvi,	6).	As	he	explained:	"Thus,	if all	English-men,	who	have	occasion	to	mention	it,	should	affirm,	that it froze	in	England the	last	Winter,	or	that	there	were	Swallows	seen there	in	the	Summer,	I	think	a	Man	could	almost	as	little	doubt	of	it,	as that	Seven	and	Four	are	Eleven"	(E,	IV.xvi,	6).	As	a	category	of	knowledge,	matters	of	fact	did	not	admit	of	strict	proof	-	the	kind	we	find	in 9. See	Serjeantson,	"Proof	and	Persuasion",	esp.	159–160. 10.	Although	Bacon	was	the	first	to	transfer	juridical	methods	into	natural	philosophy,	it	was	Boyle	who	developed	a	strategy	of	proof	specific	to	English common law, the strategy of multiplying witness testimony. See Shapin, "Boyle's Literary Technology"; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the AirPump: Hobbes, Boyle, and Experimental Life; Serjeantson, "Testimony and Proof	in	Early-Modern	England";	and	Shapiro,	"The	Concept	'Fact'",	Culture of Fact,	and	"Testimony".	Very	often the technology	of the	experiment	was so	rare	-	as	with	Boyle's	air-pump	-	that	only	a	few	individuals	could	ever experience the effects first-hand. As Shapin has argued, Boyle attempted to supplement the absence of first-hand	witnesses	with literary technologies	-	his	own	written	reports	and	illustrations	of	the	case	-	that	would	reproduce	at	a	public level the results	discovered	by	only	a few individuals. Every	reader	of	Boyle's	reports	could	in	theory	retrace	the	steps	of	the	experiment	and	judge	its	success	or	failure	-	as	if	he	or	she	were	present	(Shapin, "Boyle's	Literary	Technology",	493). acquire	a	more	fixed	meaning	in	criminal	courts,	often	referring	to	the acts	and	deeds	of	the	accused	(coming	from	the	Latin	factum,	"something	done").	Facts	in	this	sense	required	proof.	Quite	distinct	from	the meaning	they	would	later	acquire,	facts	were	not	objects	of	reasonable belief,	but	items	of	evidence	to	be	determined	by	a	jury.	Thus,	in	English	common	law,	"matters	of	fact"	referred	to	what	the	accused	had done	(for	example,	when	he	was	last	seen	on	the	night	of	the	murder), yet	their	domain	was	still	one	of	alleged	truth. While	it	is	difficult	to	say	when	the	concept	acquired	a	privileged epistemic status, early modern historians were key in shifting the meaning	of	"fact".	For	historians	of	the	time,	the	relevant	contrast	was not	between	matters	of	fact	and	matters	of	law,	but	between	matters of	fact	and	matters	of	opinion.	John	Selden,	for	example,	described	his Historie of Tithes	as	a	collection	of	"such	things	of	fact",	and	others	wrote that	a	faithful	historian	must	report	"nothing	but	fact".6	However,	the concept	did	not	yet	enjoy	an	elevated	status.	As	Francis	Bacon	viewed the	matter, "a	belief	of	history (as the lawyers	speak,	matter	of fact)" and	a	"matter	of	art	and	opinion"	belong	to	the	same	category:	that	of "things	weakly	authorized".7	In	this	respect	historical	facts	required	further	evidence	to	warrant	assent	from	others.	The	job	of	the	historian, like	the	lawyer,	was	to	convince	his	audience	of	matters	of	fact;	and in	both	cases	personal	observation	and	reliable	testimony	carried	the burden	of	proof. During	the	seventeenth	century,	the	concept	of	"fact"	found	a	new home	in	the	work	of	Robert	Boyle,	Robert	Hooke,	Joseph	Glanvill,	and other	members	of the	Royal	Society	of	London.	One	point scholars agree	upon	is	that	the	practice	of	giving	testimony	in	courts	of	law	was consciously	imitated	by	the	British	experimentalists	in	their	efforts	to redefine	the	boundaries	of	scientific	methodology.8	Within this	new context,	appeals	to	fact	were	considered	appropriate	because	the	kind 6. Cited	in	Shapiro,	Culture of Fact,	40. 7. Bacon,	The Advancement of Learning,	288. 8. See	Shapiro,	"Testimony",	esp.	250–251. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) on	the	basis	of	fact	to	establish	a	conclusive	proof	of	the	doctrine	of a	future	state	of	rewards	and	punishments	(A,	I.26,	369).12	Still	working	within Locke's framework	-	where facts rise "so near to	Certainty"	-	Butler	gave	the	concept	a	new	twist.	If	natural	religion	is	based on	matters	of	fact	-	for	example,	that	we	actually	possess	a	moral	faculty	of	judgment	-	and	if	such	facts	are	consistent	with	the	doctrines of	revealed	religion,	then	we	have	sufficient	reason	to	believe	those doctrines	are	true. In	the	absence	of	demonstrative	proof,	we	have	what	Butler	called practical	proof:	"fully	sufficient,	in	reason,	to	influence	the	actions	of men,	who	act	upon	thought	and	reflection"	(A,	I.20,	156).	Of	course, the	notion	of	practical	proof	assumes	that	we	are	free	in	our	actions; and	Butler	was	aware	of	the	objection	that	we	are	dictated	by	causes beyond	our	control, the "objection from	Necessity".	Yet in	his	view the	objection	has	no	significance;	it	only	arises	from	the	standpoint of abstract speculation. From the standpoint of real deliberation, Butler	argued,	we	are	already	conscious	of	a	"rule	of	action"	within ourselves	-	a	rule,	moreover, "of	a	very	peculiar	kind: for it	carries in	it	authority	and	a	right	of	direction;	authority	in	such	a	sense,	as that	we	cannot	depart	from	it	without	being	self-condemned"	(A,	I.26, 150).	This	is	a	"matter	of	fact"	that	no	amount	of	speculation	can	call into	question. Despite the affinities in their thinking, there is no evidence that Kant	ever	read	Butler.	Nevertheless, there	are	good	reasons	to	think the	English	bishop	had	an	indirect	influence	on	the	German	philosopher.	The	mediating	link	was	Spalding	himself,	whose	best-seller,	The Vocation of Humankind	(first	published	in	1748),	bears	the	unmistakable imprint	of	Butler's	theistic	claims.	In	this	work	Spalding	argued, like Butler,	that	we	can	infer	God's	plan	for	us	by	reflecting	on	features	of human	life	in	the	present.	The	sense	of	injustice	everyone	feels,	for	example,	when	vice	goes	unpunished	or	virtue	unrewarded	must	guide a	reflective	person	to	the	conclusion	that	such	oversights	will	be	made 12. See	also	Russell,	"Butler's	'Future	State'	and	Hume's	'Guide	of	Life'". logic	or	mathematics	-	yet	they	came	close	to	commanding	the	same degree	of	assent.	"These	Probabilities	rise	so	near	to	Certainty",	Locke concluded, "that they govern	our	Thoughts as absolutely, and influence	all	our	Actions	as	fully,	as	the	most	evident	Demonstration:	and in	what	concerns	us,	we	make	little	or	no	difference	between	them	and certain	Knowledge"	(E,	IV.xvi,	6). This	historical	overview	shows	just	how	much	the	meaning	of	"fact" changed	over	the	course	of	the	early	modern	period.	In	the	Romanocanon tradition,	matters of fact were distinguished from	matters of law, referring to human actions relevant to judicial inquiry. In English	common	law	the	term	became	more	fixed,	referring	to	the	alleged acts	and	deeds	of	the	accused.	While	the	expression	spread	rapidly	to other	contexts	over	the	course	of	the	seventeenth	century,	the	British experimentalists	were	vital	in	shifting	the	reference	of	facts	from	human	deeds to	natural	phenomena. In their	hands, facts	were	effects (often	reproduced	through	experiment)	that	warranted	the	scientist's full conviction.	Over	a	period	of two-hundred	years, then, the legal sense	of	fact	gave	way	to	what	may	be	called	a	"scientific"	sense,	coming to signify	natural phenomena	one could attest to	with certainty, even	without	claiming	to	know	their	underlying	causes.11	By	the	time of	Locke's	Essay,	facts	were	no	longer	alleged,	doubtful,	and	in	need	of proof.	They	were	actual,	immediately	certain,	and	firmly	established. 2. "Facts": From England to Germany 2.1. Butler, Spalding, and "Facts of Consciousness" 'Matters	of	fact'	(Tatsachen)	entered	the	German	language	rather	late in	the	eighteenth	century.	The	expression	was	coined	by	the	German theologian	Johann	Joachim	Spalding	in	his	1756	translation	of	Butler's Analogy of Religion,	first	published	in	1736.	In	this	work	Butler	vigorously	defended	the	compatibility	of	natural	and	revealed	religion,	arguing 11. For	a	related	claim,	see	Johnston,	"The	Natural	History	of	Fact".	I	have	also benefited	from	Austin's	("Unfair	to	Facts")	interpretation	of	the	OED	entry on	'fact'. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) perhaps	play	a	role	in	responding	to	scepticism".15	In	this	respect,	too, the	original influence	of	Spalding's translation is	easy to	detect.	At key	moments	in	the	Analogy	Butler	linked	"facts"	to	the	felt	quality	of our	cognitive	activities.	As	he	explained,	"that	the	three	angles	of	a triangle	are	equal	to	two	right	ones,	is	an	abstract	truth:	but	that	they appear	so	to	our	mind,	is	only	a	matter	of	fact"	(A,	I.26,	368;	my	emphasis).	Butler	also	insisted	that	this	is	beyond	doubt.	The	way	a	geometrical	proposition	appears	to	the	mind	"must	have	been	admitted", he	wrote,	"if	any	thing	was,	by	those	ancient	sceptics,	who	would	not have	admitted	the	former	[i. e.,	the	'abstract	truth']:	but	pretended	to doubt,	Whether	there	were	any	such	thing	as	truth,	or	Whether	we could	certainly	depend	upon	our	faculties	of	understanding	for	the knowledge	of	it	in	any	case"	(A,	I.26,	368). 2.2. "Facts" in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy We shall see that	Kant gives a very similar characterization	of the Fact	of	Reason	in	the	second	Critique.	But	first I	would	like	to	offer concrete	evidence	of	his	familiarity	with	'Tatsache'	as	a	technical	term. To	start	with,	there	is	a	Reflexion	from	the	late	1770s	where	Kant	distinguishes	"matters	of	opinion"	(Sachen der Meynung),	"matters	of	belief"	(Glaubenssachen),	and	"matters	of	fact"	(Tatsachen)	(Refl	2765).16 Clearly, this division captures a progression from	what is less certain	(opinion)	to	what	is	more	certain	(fact),	very	much	in	line	with the	sense	of	"fact"	we	have	seen	the	British	experimentalists	employ. Other	texts	show	that	by	a	Tatsache Kant	understands	what	is	actual, given,	and	incontestable.	In	an	essay	from	the	late	1780s,	for	example, he	writes:	"how	much	less	can	a	merely	arbitrary	surmise	be	placed against	facts!"	(ÜGTP,	AA	8:176),	and	elsewhere:	"The	basic	principle, that	all	knowledge	begins	solely	from	experience,	involves	a	quaestio facti,	and is thus	not	at issue	here, since the fact [Tatsache] is	unreservedly	granted"	(Progress,	AA	20:276). 15. Franks, "Transcendental	Arguments,	Reason,	and	Skepticism", 124.	See	also Franks,	"Skepticism,	Naturalism,	and	Nihilism",	esp.	56,	note	11. 16. The	specific	date	of	this	Reflexion	is	unknown. up	for	in	a	future	state,	leading	to	the	belief:	"I	am	therefore	created for	another life".13	Spalding's	book	also	sparked	a	major	controversy among	German	theologians	during	the	1770s	and	1780s	on	the	question of humankind's "vocation" (Bestimmung), and both sides of the controversy	appealed	to	Tatsachen	for	support.14	On	Spalding's	side,	for example,	Moses	Mendelssohn	argued	that if	we	want	to	know	what designs	Providence	has in store for	us,	we should	not "work	up	hypotheses"	but	only	look	to	what	"actually	happens",	that	is,	to	"matters of	fact"	(Tatsachen)	(J,	II,	6). By the 1790s, the concept developed further to include what philosophers	working in	wake	of	Kant's	philosophy	called	"facts	of consciousness"	(Tatsachen des Bewusstseins).	Karl	Reinhold	used	this phrase, for instance, to	designate "a kind	of evidence that	was	neither	deductive	nor	inductive	but	nevertheless	valid,	and	that	could 13. Spalding,	Bestimmung,	192.	For	helpful	discussions	of	Spalding's	influence	on German theology and	philosophy in the late eighteenth century, see	Zammito,	Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology;	di	Giovanni,	Freedom and Religion;	Brandt,	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant;	Munzel,	Kant's Conception of Pedagogy;	Tippmann,	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Johann Joachim Spalding;	and	Printy,	"Spalding	and	the	Protestant	Enlightenment".	See	also	di Giovanni,	"The	Year	1786". 14. The	same	is	true	for	the	so-called	"fragments	controversy"	(Fragmentenstreit) that erupted	after	Lessing	published	parts	of	Hermann	Samuel	Reimarus's manuscript under the title "Fragments from an Unnamed Author". In this manuscript	Reimarus	wanted	to	use	the	Gospels'	diverging	accounts	of	the Resurrection	to	challenge	doctrines	of	revealed	religion.	Among	the	defenders	of	Lutheran	Orthodoxy,	Johann	Heinrich	Ress	made	an	important	reply with	his	book	Geschichte Jesu Christi. At	one	point,	for	example,	Ress	affirmed: "My	principle	is:	there	is	no	objection	to	experience	and	matters	of	fact	[...]	It is	experience	that	the	magnet	attracts	iron;	and	all	metaphysical	and	physical reasons	do	not	dispute	it.	It	is	a	matter	of	fact	that	Christ	rose	again,	because we	have	the	gospel	-	a	sure	success	of	this	great	incident	-	which	it	brings almost	before	our	eyes"	(Es ist Tatsache, da Christus auserstanden, denn wir haben Evangelium, ein so sicherer Erfolg dieses groen Vorfalls, da er ihn uns beinahe vor die Augen bringt) (Geschichte Jesu Christi, 172;	my translation).	Ress	was	not the only	author	of the time to characterize the	Resurrection	as	a	Tatsache. See also	Lavater,	Geheimes Tagebuch von einem Beobachter seiner selbst,	esp.	151;	and Starck,	Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche des Ersten Jahrhunderts,	esp.	864. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) to	empirical	sources.	Yet	Kant	thinks	there	is	a	positive	claim	we	can draw	from	this.	If	we	actually	possess	synthetic	a	priori	cognition,	we can	infer	that	it	must	have	a	pure	source,	because	experience	does	not teach	us	necessity.	After	all,	no	empirical	faculty	could	have	generated this	cognition	within	us	(a	point	I	will	consider	in	more	detail	below). Even	so,	Kant's	positive	claim	invites	us	to	ask:	What	proof	do	we have	that	we	possess	synthetic	a	priori	cognition?	In	the	B	edition	of the	first	Critique,	Kant	answers	this	in	a	rather	striking	way.	Instead	of demonstrating	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition	using	a	method of	deduction,	we	find	him	illustrating	it	using	a	method	of	experiment. Speaking	now	to	the	reader,	he	writes: Gradually remove from your experiential concept of a body everything that is empirical in it	-	the color, the hardness	or	softness,	the	weight,	even	the	impenetrability	-	there	still remains the	space that	was	occupied	by the	body	(which	has	now	entirely	disappeared),	and	you cannot	leave	that	out.	Likewise,	if	you	remove	from	your empirical	concept	of	every	object,	whether	corporeal	or incorporeal, all those properties of which experience teaches	you,	you	could	still	not	take	from	it	that	by	means of	which you think	of it as a substance [...]	Thus, convinced	by	the	necessity	with	which	this	concept	presses itself	on	you,	you	must	concede	that	it	has	its	seat	in	your faculty	of	cognition	a priori.	(B6)18 18. Initially	we	might	think	Kant	is	advancing	a	psychological	claim	in	this	passage,	saying	that	we	cannot	conceive	the	absence	of	space,	for	example,	due to	our	peculiar	cognitive	makeup.	Yet	on	closer	inspection	it	is	clear	he	has a	different	sense	of	"necessity"	in	mind,	one	that	is	properly	epistemic. I	am borrowing this terminology from	Henry	Allison (Kant's Transcendental Idealism,	esp.	104–105).	In	the	first	Critique	Kant	further	says	that	the	necessity	of space	grounds the "apodictic	certainty"	of	geometrical	principles.	For if	we drew	our	representation	of	space	from	experience	(i. e.,	"from	general	outer experience"),	geometrical	principles	would	have the same	contingency	we find	in	perception.	We	could	not	say,	for	example,	that	a	straight	line	is	necessarily	the	shortest	distance	between	two	points,	only	that	experience	always teaches	us	that	(A24/B39). There	are	also	places	where	Kant	uses	'Faktum'	in	the	same	way.17	In the	B	edition	of	the	first	Critique,	published	in	1787,	Kant	twice	claims that	our	possession	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition	is	a	fact,	using	'Tatsache'	in	the	first	passage	and	'Faktum'	in	the	second: Now	it	is	easy	to	show	that	in	human	cognition	there	actually	are	such	necessary	and	in	the	strictest	sense	universal, thus	pure	a priori	judgments.	If	one	wants	an	example	from the	sciences,	one	need	only	look	at	all	the	propositions	of mathematics; if	one	would	have	one	from	the	commonest	use	of	the	understanding,	the	proposition	that	every alteration	must	have	a	cause	will	do	[...]	[So]	we	can	content	ourselves	with	having	displayed	[dargelegt]	the	pure use	of	our	cognitive	faculty	as	a	fact	[den reinen Gebrauch unseres Erkenntnivermgens als Tatsache].	(B5) The famous	Locke,	from	neglect	of	this	consideration,	and because	he	encountered	pure	concepts	of	the	understanding	in	experience,	also	derived	them	from	this	experience. The	empirical derivation, however, [to	which	Hume resorted	as	well],	cannot	be	reconciled	with	the	reality	of	the scientific	cognition	a priori that	we	possess, that	namely of	pure mathematics	and	general	natural science,	and	is therefore	refuted	by	the	fact	[Faktum].	(B127–128) Setting	details	aside,	Kant's	point	in	these	passages	is	clear.	Synthetic a	priori	cognition is	not	something	we	can	doubt, since	we	actually possess	it in	pure	mathematics	and	general	natural	science.	By	itself, this should shake	any confidence	we	might	have in the	naturalistic programs	of	Locke	or	Hume,	who	would	like	to	reduce	pure	concepts 17. In	another	Reflexion,	this	time	from	the	late	1790s,	Kant	writes	that	the	idea of	participating	in	a	cosmopolitan	world	must	be	the	"wish"	(Wünsch)	of	all rational	human	beings,	describing	this	as	a	Faktum	whose	reality	we	can	call all	persons	to	witness	("ein Faktum, über dessen Wirklichkeit man alle Menschen zu Zeugen rufen kann")	(Refl	8077). o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) Second,	in	view	of	the	historical	observations	sketched	earlier,	it	is noteworthy	that	Kant	identifies	a	mode	of	cognition as	a	"fact".	With members	of	the	Royal	Society,	as	we	have	seen,	matters	of	fact	shifted in reference from	human	deeds to	natural	phenomena. In	Germany, nearly	a	century	later, the	concept	was	shifting	yet	again,	coming	to signify	mental	states	accessible	to	any	reflective	human	being. Interestingly,	the	passages	I	have	cited	above	still	show	Kant's	debt	to	the experimentalist	tradition:	he	is	only	willing	to	identify	mental	states	as 'Tatsache'	if	they	are	actual,	immediately	certain,	and	prior	to	speculation.20	So	while	the	German	phrase	was	increasingly	associated	with facts of consciousness	-	accessible first-personally	-	'Tatsache' retained	the	elevated	status	Boyle	and	others	had	originally	conferred on	the	term.21 20.	Of	course,	Kant	does	not	make	his	debt	to	this	tradition	a	secret.	In	the	first Critique	he	claims	that	it	was	"the	ingenious	Francis	Bacon"	who	was	partly responsible	for	putting	natural	philosophy	onto	the	path	of	science	(Bxix). In Kant's view, the examples of mathematics and natural science "were remarkable	enough that	we	might reflect	on the	essential	element in the change	in	the	ways	of	thinking	that	has	been	so	advantageous	to	them,	and, at	least	as	an	experiment,	imitate	it	insofar	as	their	analogy	with	metaphysics, as rational cognition,	might permit" (Bxv–xvi). Further references to the	experimental	method	run	throughout	the	first	Critique	(see	also	Bxviii; Bxxxviii;	A356;	A804/B832;	A821/B849;	A826/B854;	A838/B866).	Perhaps the	most	striking	occurs	in	a	footnote	at	Bxxi.	After	characterizing	how	we should emulate the revolution	of the sciences in	metaphysics,	Kant says: "This	method, imitated from the	method	of those	who study	nature, thus consists	in	this:	to	seek	the	elements	of	pure	reason	in	that	which admits of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment".	For	further	discussion,	see	Vanzo,	"Kant	on	Experiment". 21. Here	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	Schopenhauer	criticized	Kant's	immediate successors	(Reinhold	specifically)	for	characterizing	the	moral	law	as	an	"immediately	certain	Faktum"	(unmittelbar gewisses Faktum)	and	an	"original	Tatsache	of	moral	consciousness"	(ursprüngliche Tatsache des moralischen Bewussteins).	Schopenhauer	believed	this	contradicted	Kant's	explicit	warning	from the	Groundwork that	we	cannot	derive the	moral law	"from	some	particular property of human nature"	(GMS,	AA	4:425).	If	we	render	the	moral	law	a	fact	of consciousness,	Schopenhauer	wrote,	"then	it	would	be	grounded	anthropologically	through	experience,	albeit	inner	experience,	and	thus	empirically;	which goes	directly	against	Kant's	view	and	is	repeatedly	rejected	by	him"	(Grundlage,	III.	665;	my	translation).	However,	I	believe	Schopenhauer	was	mistaken to	read	the	concept	of	a	fact	in	a	narrow	sense,	i. e.,	as	a	psychological	fact	of By having us employ a procedure of abstraction, Kant wants us to see that certain cognitions	are	necessary for experience.	We	cannot conceive	the	absence	of	space,	for	example,	so	the	representation	of space	must	be	necessary	for	the	way	we	apprehend	outer	appearances. Granting	that	such	epistemic	necessity	is	not	something	that	could	arise from	an	empirical	faculty,	we	must	concede	that	it	came	from	a	pure faculty. In	this	way, the	aim	of	Kant's thought	experiment is to	elicit our	actual	consciousness	of	epistemic	necessity,	so	that	when	we	ask, "How	is	this	consciousness	possible?"	we	are	led	directly	to	its	source, whether in a pure faculty of intuition (as	with 'space') or in a pure faculty	of	understanding	(as	with	'substance').	In	the	next	section	we shall	see	that	Kant	uses	a	very	similar	thought	experiment	in	the	second	Critique,	one	that	serves	to	illustrate	our	actual	consciousness	of the	moral	law.	The	point	of	the	experiment,	I	will	argue,	is	to	show	that we	must	possess	a	pure	or	"higher"	faculty	of	desire	-	a	faculty	where reason	(and	not	inclination)	determines	the	will.19 3. The Fact of Reason in the Second Critique Let	me	draw	two	general	observations	from	the	texts	gathered	so	far. First,	it	is	clear	from	both	his	published	and	unpublished	writings	that Kant	uses	'Faktum'	and	'Tatsache'	in	the	newer,	scientific	sense	(i. e.,	of something actually the case, and so demanding no proof), in contrast	to	the	older, legal	sense	(i. e.,	of	something	allegedly	done,	and so	capable	of	proof).	Kant	foreshadows	this	in	his	1783	Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics	when	he	claims	to	be	starting	with	something "already	known	to	be	dependable",	namely,	the	propositions	of	mathematics	and	natural	science,	some	of	which	are	"apodictically	certain" through	reason	alone	(Prol,	AA	4:275).	As	he	says:	"We	have	some	at least	uncontested synthetic	cognition	a priori,	and	we	do	not	need	to	ask whether	it	is	possible	(for	it	is	actual)"	(Prol,	AA	4:275). 19. As	Kant	puts	it,	only	"insofar	as	reason	of	itself	(not	in	the	service	of	the	inclinations)	determines	the	will,	is	reason	a	true	higher faculty	of	desire"	(KpV, AA 5:24–25). o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) In the example discussed earlier (from	B6),	Kant argued that space is	not something	we	can	abstract from	a	body,	making space	necessary	for	our	representation	of	a	body.	Moreover,	because	this	kind	of epistemic	necessity is not something	we can learn from	experience (and so	does	not spring from	an	empirical faculty),	we	are justified to	infer	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	faculty	of	intuition.	In	the	passage cited	above,	Kant	wants	to	extend	this	line	of	reasoning	to	the	practical	sphere.	He	wants	to	show	that	we	discover	the	concept	of	a	higher faculty	of	desire	in	the	same	way:	by	paying	attention	to	the	necessity of	moral	laws,	the	way	they	exclude	sensible	incentives	from	entering into	our	maxims.23	(Although	Kant	does	not	speak	in	this	way,	we	may say	moral	laws	express	deliberative necessity.) Unfortunately,	what	Kant	says	after	he	introduces	the	Fact	of	Reason at	KpV,	AA	5:31	is	quite	obscure.	"Our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law may	be	called	a	Fact	of	Reason",	he	writes,	"because	one	cannot	reason it	out	from	antecedent	data	of	reason,	for	example,	from	consciousness of	freedom	(since	this	is	not	antecedently	given	to	us)	and	because	it instead	forces	itself	upon	us	of	itself	as	a	synthetic	a	priori	proposition and	this	must	be	proven	in	the	same	way	we	proved	the	representations	of space	and	time	as	a priori representations,	only	with	the	difference	that	the latter	concern	intuitions	but	the	former	mere	concepts	of	reason"	(Refl	7201). For	helpful	discussion,	see	Allison	(Kant's Theory of Freedom,	234–235). 23. I	agree	with	Guyer	("Problems	with	Freedom")	that	the	Fact	of	Reason	refers not	to	our	consciousness	of	moral	"necessitation"	(Nötigung)	-	the	constraint of the law	upon	our	sensibly	affected	nature	-	but	to	our	consciousness	of its	"necessity"	(Notwendigkeit)	-	the	authority	of	the	law	as	a	law	of	pure	practical reason.	This is	an important	point	of	clarification, for it shows	(contra Schopenhauer)	that	Kant	is	abiding	by	the	requirement	he	lays	down	in	the Groundwork: namely, that the authority of the	moral law	does not depend on	any	capacity	unique to	human	nature (GMS,	AA	4:447–448).	As	Guyer notes,	our	consciousness	of	moral	necessity	is	"something	that	would	be	selfevident	for	any	rational	being,	not	just	a	human	being",	and	on	these	grounds we	are	warranted	to	infer	that	the	moral	law	"must	have	a	pure	source	within us"	("Problems	with	Freedom",	192).	On	this	point	of	interpretation,	I	disagree with	Rauscher	("Kant's	Moral	Anti-Realism"),	who	equates	the	Fact	of	Reason with	moral	necessitation,	and	with	Grenberg	(Common Moral Experience)	and Schönecker	("Kant's	Moral	Intuitionism"),	who	limit	our	access	to	the	moral law to the feeling of respect. For further discussion, see	my "Accessing the Moral	Law	Through	Feeling". Having	this framework	in	view,	I think	we	can	bring	a	novel	perspective	to	Kant's	strategy	of	justification	in	the	second	Critique.	First, there is	a	noteworthy	continuity	between	his	doctrine	of the	Fact	of Reason	and	the	argument-structure	we	have	seen	in	the	B	edition	of the	first	Critique	and	the	Prolegomena.	Kant	draws	attention	to	this	continuity	when	he	asks,	"But	how	is	consciousness	of	that	moral	law	possible?"	(KpV,	AA	5:30).	In	reply,	he	writes: We	can	become	aware	of	pure	practical laws just	as	we are	aware	of	pure	theoretical	principles,	by	paying	attention to the	necessity [Notwendigkeit]	with	which reason prescribes	them	to	us	and	to	the	setting	aside	of	all	empirical	conditions	to	which	reason	directs	us.	The	concept of	a	pure	will	springs	from	the	first,	as	consciousness	of a	pure	understanding	springs	from	the	latter	[Der Begriff eines reinen Willens entspringt aus den ersteren, wie das Bewutsein eines reinen Verstandes aus dem letzteren].	(KpV, AA 5:30;	modified)22 experience. If	we	understand	the	Fact	of	Reason	in	terms	of	our	consciousness	of	moral	necessity	(which	would	be	common	to	all	rational	beings),	then Schopenhauer's	objection	loses	its	force.	See	note	23	below. 22.	A	qualification	is	in	order.	In	the	theoretical	sphere,	space	and	time	are	pure intuitions	"that	contain	a priori the	conditions	of	the	possibility	of	objects	as appearances",	and	for	this	reason	there	is	no	need	to	establish	their	objective validity	(A89/B121).	By	contrast,	categories	like	substance	are	pure	concepts that	do	not	require	corresponding	sensory	data,	and	that is	why	Kant is	responsible	for	demonstrating	their	objective	application	(i. e.,	by	way	of	a	transcendental	deduction).	Given	this	asymmetry,	the	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Reason	is	closer	to	Kant's	metaphysical	expositions	of	space	and	time	than	it	is to	his	transcendental	deduction	of	the	categories.	Moral	laws	do	not	require corresponding	empirical	motives	to	bind	the	will	of	a	rational	being,	and	for this	reason	they	are	"immediately	lawgiving".	Showing	that	they	spring	from	a higher	faculty	of	desire	obviates	the	need	to	establish	their	objective	authority.	Kant	draws	attention	to	this	parallelism	in	a	Reflexion	from	the	1780s:	"The critique	of	practical	reason	has	as	its	basis	the	differentiation	of	empirically conditioned	practical	reason	from	the	pure	and	yet	practical	reason	and	asks whether	there	is	such	a	thing	as	the	latter.	The	critique	cannot	have	insight into	this	possibility	a priori because	it	concerns	the	relation	of	a	real	ground	to a	consequence,	thus	something	must	be	given	which	can	arise	from	it	alone; and	from	reality	possibility	can	be	inferred.	The	moral laws	are	of	this	sort, o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) law	may	be	called	a	Faktum	of	reason"	(KpV,	AA	5:31).	So	within	the logic of this paragraph,	we can see that Kant's 'Faktum' carries the meaning	of	'Tatsache'	in	the	scientific	sense,	i. e.,	of	something	real	or actually	the	case.	The 'Faktum' refers	to	our	actual	consciousness	of the	moral	law's	deliberative	necessity.25 Now,	however,	we	must	ask	the	same	question	as	before:	What proof	do	we	have	that	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	actual? As	we saw in the theoretical sphere,	Kant	does	not think	we	need to	argue	for	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition;	we	need	only illustrate	it	with	examples	from	mathematics	and	natural	science.	Interestingly,	Kant	wants	us	to	use	this	same	strategy	in	the	practical sphere.	We	need	only illustrate the reality of	moral consciousness, and	we	can	do this,	he thinks,	by turning to	examples	of common moral judgment.	Thus,	after introducing	the	Fact	of	Reason	at	KpV, AA	5:30,	Kant	writes:	"The	Faktum	mentioned	above	is	undeniable", adding: "One need only analyze the judgments that people [Menschen]	pass	on the lawfulness	of their actions in	order to	find that, whatever	inclination	may	say	to	the	contrary,	their	reason,	incorruptible	and	self-constrained,	always	holds	the	maxim	of	the	will in	an 25. On	this	point	my	reading	is	close	to	Kleingeld's	-	who	also	reads	'Faktum'	as a kind of 'Tatsache'	-	although there are differences worth	mentioning. In Kleingeld's	view,	"the	entire	argument	[of	the	Fact	of	Reason]	can	be	cast	in (presumably	'non-moral')	terms	of	a	theory	of	action	and	be	regarded	as	the articulation	of the	self-understanding	of	agents	who	take themselves to	be reasoning	about	which	maxims	to	adopt	and	why"	("Moral	Consciousness", 70).	She	first	supports	this	reading	with	Kant's	remark	that	we	need	only	analyze	"the	judgments	people	pass	on	the	lawfulness	of	their	actions"	to	confirm the	Fact	of	Reason	(KpV,	AA	5:32).	As	I	see	things,	however,	it	is	debatable whether	Kant	meant "lawfulness"	here in	non-moral terms.	Kleingeld then maintains that the Fact of Reason refers to our consciousness of "the fundamental	law	of	pure	practical	reason",	a	law	that	is	"subsequently	called	the moral	law"	("Moral	Consciousness",	66;	my	emphasis).	However,	in	section 6	-	before	Kant	introduces	the	"fundamental	law"	-	he	writes:	"It	is	therefore the	moral law [...]	that	first offers	itself	to	us	and	[...]	leads	directly	to	the	concept	of	freedom"	(KpV,	AA	5:29).	Given	these	discrepancies,	I	share	Ameriks's doubts ("Practical Justification") regarding the	prospect	of reconstructing	a "non-moral	route"	in	the	second	Critique.	See	note	26	below. that	is	not	based	on	any	intuition,	either	pure	or	empirical"	(KpV, AA 5:31).	This	remark	has	led	many	commentators	to	conclude	that	Kant is	slipping	into	a	kind	of	dogmatism	in	the	second	Critique	-	resorting to "foot-stomping"	and "moralistic	bluster"	-	and it certainly sounds as	if	he	is	asserting	our	moral	consciousness	as	a	brute	fact.	After	all, what	else	could	it	mean	to	say	our	moral	consciousness	"forces	itself upon	us",	if	not	that	we	have	direct,	intuitive	insight	to	the	truth	of	the moral	law?	Despite	these	worries,	what	Kant	says	before	this	passage is	more	helpful,	in	my	view,	and	points	the	way	to	a	more	charitable reading	of	the	text.24 Kant	asks	us	to	compare	moral	laws	to	the	rules	we	find	in	pure geometry (KpV, AA 5:31). The latter, he says, "contain nothing further	than	the	presupposition	that	one	could	do	something	if it	were required	that	one	should	do	it".	By	contrast,	moral	laws	say	that	"one ought	absolutely to	proceed	in	a	certain	way"	(KpV,	AA	5:31). (This is	the	deliberative	necessity	I	just	spoke	of.)	As	we	read	further,	it	is clear that	Kant also	wants to	highlight the status	of	our	moral consciousness itself.	We	are,	he	explains,	actually	conscious	that	moral laws	provide	us	with	immediate	determining	grounds	of	choice,	and for	that	reason	we	do	not	need	to	ask	whether	our	moral	consciousness	is	possible.	Not	surprisingly,	then,	right	after	Kant	says	it	is	"not impossible"	to	think	of	practical	laws	that	direct	the	will	immediately, he	employs	the	language	of	fact:	"Consciousness	of	this	fundamental 24.	Commentators	have	also	been	troubled	by	Kant's	remark	that	the	moral	law "cannot	be	proved	by	any	deduction"	although	it	is	"firmly	established	of	itself" (KpV,	AA	5:46;	cf.	MS,	AA	6:225	where	Kant	says	moral	laws	are	"incapable of being proved	and	yet	apodictic").	In	Hegel's	memorable	phrase,	the	moral	law seems	to	be	the	"final	undigested	lump	left	within	the	stomach,	the	revelation given	to	reason"	(quoted	in	Allison,	Freedom,	281).	However,	it is	important to	keep in	mind	what	Kant	means	by	a "deduction".	As	he	explains in the subsequent	paragraph,	concepts	of	pure	understanding	or	categories	admit of	a	deduction	(i. e.,	a justification	of their	objective	and	universal	validity), because	they	refer	to	objects	of	possible	experience.	We	can	in	turn	show	that they	are	cognizable	only	by	virtue	of	these	very	categories.	No	such	deduction	of	the	moral	law	is	forthcoming,	since	no	exact	observation	of	it	can	be found	in	experience	(KpV,	AA	5:46–47).	Kant	makes	a	similar	claim	at	the	end of	Groundwork	III	(see	GMS,	AA	4:463). o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) If	we now read this passage in light of	KpV, AA 5:30, a clear picture	of	what	motivates	Kant's	doctrine	of the	Fact	of	Reason takes shape.	A	law	that	commands	"completely	a	priori	and	independent of	any	sensible	data"	is	logically	coherent.	Yet	that	does	not	give	us the	conclusion	Kant	is	seeking:	that	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	(as opposed	to	an	empirical)	faculty	of	desire.	We	are	first	required	to show	that	we	are	actually conscious of	this	law	as	a	ground	of	choice before	we	can	infer	the	condition	of	its	possibility.	And	that	is	why the	judgments	of	common	reason	are	essential	for	Kant's	strategy	of justification. Just as examples from	mathematics and science confirm	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition,	judgments	from	ordinary	people	confirm	the	reality	of	moral	consciousness.	Both provide us with grounds to infer the existence of a pure faculty within us, whether of cognition or of desire. 4. Kant's Thought Experiments 4.1. An Advantage Like a Chemist At this	point it	may	be tempting to read	Kant's claim from KpV, AA 5:32	-	that	"one	need	only	analyze	the	judgments	people	pass	on	the lawfulness	of	their	maxims"	-	as	an	appeal	to	empirical	evidence.27	It is	of	course	true	that	(most)	human	beings	engage	in	moral	behavior, is	something	actual	-	a	"fact"	-	which	in	turn	warrants	the	assumption	that our	faculty	of	desire	is	also	pure	(and	not	merely	affected	by	sensible	incentives)	(KpV,	AA	5:31).	As	a	reviewer	for	this	journal	helped	me	to	see,	one	may still	wonder:	How	should	we	view	the	relationship	between	(a)	the	authority of	the	moral	law	and	(b)	the	existence	of	a	pure	faculty	within	us?	My	reply, briefly	put,	is	that	Kant	is	not	offering	an	argumentative	route	to	the	moral law's	authority;	rather,	he	is	starting	with	our	consciousness	of	this	authority as	a	"Tatsache".	The	point	I	have	wanted	to	stress in	this	paper,	however, is that	while	the	moral	law	admits	of	no	deduction,	Kant	nevertheless	deploys experiments	in	the	second	Critique	that	serve	to	produce	our	consciousness	of moral	necessity. 27.	Moyar ("Unstable Autonomy", 333) and Grenberg (Common Moral Experience,	151)	have	-	correctly,	I	believe	-	found	Proops	guilty	of	this	reading.	In Proops's	view,	"what	would	reveal	the	non-empirical	origin	of	the	idea	of	duty would	be	its	constancy	across	persons	whose	quality	and	level	of	moral	education	differed	widely"	("Kant's	Legal	Metaphor",	226). action	up	to	the	pure	will,	that	is,	to	itself	inasmuch	as	it	regards	itself as	a	priori	practical"	(KpV,	AA	5:32). Later in the second	Critique	Kant	explains	why the judgments	of "common reason"	have	a	justificatory	role	to	play	in	this	context	(KpV, AA	5:91).	He	observes	that	in	the	theoretical	sphere	it	was	"easily	and evidently	proved"	that	we	possess	a	pure	faculty	of	cognition,	since	we have	"examples	from	the	sciences"	ready	at	hand.	Such	sciences	"put their	principles	to	the	test	in	so	many	ways	by	methodic	use",	so	we need	not	fear	what	Kant	calls	"a	secret	mixture	of	empirical	grounds" underlying	them	(KpV,	AA	5:91).	Turning	now	to	the	practical	sphere, he	writes: But that	pure reason,	without the	admixture	of	any	empirical	determining	ground,	is	practical	of	itself	alone:	this one	had	to	be	able	to	show	from	the	most common practical use of reason, by	confirming	the	supreme	practical	principle	as	one	that	every	natural	human	reason	cognizes	-	a law	completely	a	priori	and	independent	of	any	sensible data	-	as	the	supreme	law	of	its	will.	It	was	necessary	first to	establish	and	justify	the	purity	of	its	origin	even	in the judgment of this common reason before	science	would	take it	in	hand	in	order	to	make	use	of	it,	so	to	speak,	as	a	Faktum	that	precedes	all	subtle	reasoning	about	its	possibility and	all	the	consequences	that	may	be	drawn	from	it.	(KpV, AA	5:91)26 26.	Citing this	passage,	Rawls	also	highlights the importance	of common	moral judgment for interpreting	Kant's	doctrine	of the	Fact	of	Reason.	On this point	I	am	indebted	to	his	approach.	However,	I	am	not	committed	to	Rawls's further	claim	that	by	the	time	of	the	second	Critique	Kant	had	developed	"a constructivist	conception	of	practical	reason"	(Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy,	268).	As	Kain	points	out	("Realism	and	Anti-Realism",	"Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason"), there are difficulties facing constructivist	readings	of	Kant's	ethics.	Setting	these	difficulties	aside,	I	am also	not	sure	how	Rawls	thinks	the	Fact	of	Reason	justifies	(or	"authenticates", as	he	prefers	to	say)	the	moral	law.	As	I	understand	the	structure	of	Chapter	I, Kant	begins	with	a	conceptual	argument	for	why	there	can	only	be	one	fundamental	law	of	pure	practical	reason,	the	"moral	law"	(KpV,	AA	5:30).	Then, after	this	conceptual	argument,	Kant	claims	that	our	consciousness	of	this	law o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) in the place of an honest	man) is confronted	with the moral law in	which	he cognizes the	worthlessness	of a liar,	his	practical	reason	(in	its	judgment	of	what	he	ought to	do)	at	once	abandons	the	advantage,	unites	with	what maintains in him respect for his own person (truthfulness),	and	the	advantage,	after	it	has	been	separated	and washed	from	every	particle	of	reason	(which	is	altogether on	the	side	of	duty),	is	weighed	by	everyone,	so	that	it	can enter	into	combination	with	reason	in	other	cases.	(KpV, AA	5:92–93)29 While	they	are	difficult	to	see	at	first,	thought	experiments	of	this	sort run	throughout	the	second	Critique.30	One	that	deserves	special	attention	occurs	at	KpV,	AA	5:30,	only	paragraphs	before	Kant	first	speaks of	the	Fact	of	Reason.	In	this	section	of	the	text	Kant	has	argued	that we	only become aware	of our freedom through the	moral law, and to	prove	this	he	introduces	a	character	who	reports	to	have	a	lustful inclination	he	cannot	control	(KpV,	AA	5:30).	In	what	follows	Kant	arranges	for	us	a	narrative	with	two	scenes.	In	the	first	scene,	the	lustful man	is	asked	what	he	would	do	if,	upon	satisfying	his	inclination,	he were	immediately	strung	up	on	a	gallows: 29.	See also Rohden, "An Experiment with Practical Reason", esp. 103; Keller, "Two	Conceptions	of	Compatibilism",	esp.	124,	and	Timmermann,	"Reversal or	Retreat?",	esp.	88,	note	29. 30.	For	example, at	KpV,	AA	5:25,	Kant	writes: "Suppose that	an	acquaintance whom	you	otherwise	liked	tried	to	justify	to	you	his	having	given	false	testimony	by	first	pleading	what	he	asserts	to	be	the	sacred	duty	of	his	own	happiness	[...]	Or	suppose	that	someone	recommends	to	you	as	steward	a	man	to whom	you	could	blindly	trust	all	your	affairs	and,	in	order	to	inspire	you	with confidence,	extols	him	as	a	prudent	human	being	with	masterly	understanding	of	his	own	advantage".	In	the	first	case,	Kant	says,	"you	would	either	laugh in	his	face	or	shrink	back	from	him	with	disgust"	(KpV,	AA	5:26).	In	the	second	case,	"you	would	believe	either	that	the	recommender	was	making	a	fool of	you	or	that	he	had	lost	his	mind"	(KpV,	AA	5:26).	Thus,	Kant	concludes:	"So distinctly	and	sharply	drawn	are	the	boundaries	of	morality	and	self-love	that even	the	most	common	eye	cannot	fail	to	distinguish	whether	something	belongs	to	the	one	or	the	other"	(KpV,	AA	5:26).	For	similar	examples,	see	KpV, AA	5:37,	and	5:88–89. if	only	by	judging	their	actions	"good"	or	"bad".	But	I	believe	it	would be	a	mistake	to	read	Kant's	strategy	in	this	way.	Kant	does	not	want	us to	observe	the	standpoint	of	common	reason	from	a	theoretical,	thirdpersonal	perspective.	Rather,	he	wants	us	to	take	up	this	standpoint ourselves,	so	that	we	can	illustrate	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law from	a	practical,	first-personal perspective. Kant	calls	attention	to	this	perspective	later	in	the	second	Critique (KpV,	AA	5:92).	In	a	gesture	at	once	odd	and	intriguing,	he	claims	that a	philosopher	has	an	advantage	"like	a	chemist"	in	that	he	can	set	up experiments	with every ordinary person.	As	he puts it, the philosopher	can	"distinguish	the	moral	(pure)	determining	ground	from	the empirical,	namely,	by	adding	the	moral	law	(as	a	determining	ground) to	the	empirically	affected	will	(e. g.,	that	of	someone	who	would	gladly	lie	because	he	can	gain	something	by	it)"	(KpV,	AA	5:92).28	To	make the	metaphor	vivid,	Kant	compares	the	philosopher's	experiment	to	a process	of	adding	alkali	to	hydrochloric	acid: When	an	analyst	adds	alkali to	a	solution	of	calcareous earth	in	hydrochloric	acid, the	acid	at	once	releases	the lime	and	unites	with	the	alkali,	and	the	lime	is	precipitated.	In	just	the	same	way,	if	a	man	who	is	otherwise	honest (or	who just this	once	puts	himself	only in thought 28.	Returning	now	to	the	obscure	passage	from	KpV,	AA	5:31,	we	can	see	that, far	from	resorting	to	a	dogmatic	position,	Kant	is	merely	stating	that	our	consciousness	of the	moral law is	not accessible	outside a	normatively "thick" practical	perspective.	For	obvious	reasons,	it	is	not	accessible	from	a	speculative	point	of	view,	because	speculative	reason	only teaches	us the law	of causal	mechanism,	the	antithesis	of	freedom.	For	less	obvious	reasons,	Kant's point	is	that	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	not	accessible	from	a	"thin" practical	perspective.	For	when	we	examine	the	capacities	anyone	must	possess	to	function	as	a	rational	agent	(e. g.,	a	capacity	to	step	back	and	reflect	on one's	desires),	there	is	nothing	internal	to	these	capacities	that	would	bind one to a law other than one's own	happiness. That is	why	-	as	Kant says elsewhere	-	the	"most	rational	being	of	the	world"	might	be	oblivious	to	the moral	law	and	so	"might	still	need	some	incentives,	coming	to	him	from	the objects	of	the	inclinations,	in	order	to	determine	his	power	of	choice"	(RGV, AA	6:27n).	In	light	of	these	considerations,	I	find	it	difficult	to	associate	Kant's mature	ethics	with	recent	constitutivist	arguments	for	moral	normativity. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) reflects	on	his	duty,	we see that	he	must reach	an	entirely	different verdict:	namely,	that	he	would	be	worthless	as	a	liar,	and	that	refusing the	prince	is	the	only	choice	that	would	maintain	his	self-respect.	He would	thus	abandon	whatever	advantage	he	sees	in	the	lie	(as	the	acid "at	once	releases	the	lime")	and	acknowledge	the	authority	of	the	moral law	(as	the	acid	"unites	with	the	alkali").32 In working through the second scene, we stand to witness the man's	inner	transformation,	whereby	he	comes	to	deliberate	without giving	priority to his own	happiness, and so	without letting empirical	motives enter into	his	maxims. In judging	what he ought to do, the	man	is	conscious	of	a	law	"completely	a	priori	and	independent	of any	sensible	data",	and	he	is	conscious	of	it,	moreover,	as	an	immediate	ground	of	choice.	In	my	understanding,	the	aim	of	Kant's	thought experiment	is	to	elicit	this	fact	from	the	reader,	so	that	he	or	she	may see	how	people	separate	duty	from	self-interest	as	if	the	two	were	unmixable	chemical	compounds.	In	this	respect,	when	we	work	through the steps of the experiment, we take up a deliberative perspective available	to	all	rational	beings.33	And	that	is	why	Kant	thinks	we	have grounds	to	treat	moral	consciousness	"as	a	fact	that	precedes	all	subtle reasoning	about	its	possibility"	(KpV,	AA	5:91),	deciding	that	it	must spring	from	a	pure	faculty	within	us.	Beyond	this,	we	do	not	need	a 32. The	experiment	would	still	work	even	if	the	man	decided	he	would	give	in to the	prince's	demand, for	he	would	not thereby	claim	his	maxim	should become	a	universal	law.	As	Kant	makes	clear	in	the	Groundwork,	in	any	transgression	of	duty	"we	find	that	we	do	not	really	will	that	our	maxim	should become	a	universal	law,	since	that	is	impossible	for	us,	but	that	the	opposite of	our	maxim	should	instead	remain	a	universal	law	[e. g.,	refusing	the	prince], only	we	take	the	liberty	of	making	an	exception to	it	for	ourselves	(or	just	for this	once)	to	the	advantage	of	our	inclination"	(GMS,	AA	4:424). 33. For	this	reason	my	account	avoids	an	objection	Moyar	has	brought	against first-personal	readings	of	the	second	Critique.	In	Moyar's	view,	these	readings establish	the	reality	of	freedom	only	"for the reader	who	successfully	takes	up and	is	moved	by	the	examples	considered	in	the	text."	Yet	as	he	points	out: "Kant	surely	meant	for	the	deduction	to	establish	the	reality	of	freedom	from the	practical	point	of	view,	not	just	from	my	practical	point	of	view"	("Unstable	Autonomy",	334).	On	my	interpretation,	Kant's	thought	experiments	serve to	illustrate	a	fact	for	all	rational	agents,	not	just	for	human	agents	-	and	certainly	not	just	for	readers	of	the	second	Critique.	See	note	23	above. Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when	the	desired	object	and	the	opportunity	are	present, it is quite irresistible to him; ask him	whether, if a gallows	were	erected in front	of the	house	where	he	finds this	opportunity	and	he	would	be	hanged	on	it immediately	after	gratifying	his lust,	he	would	not	then	control his	inclination.	One	need	not	conjecture	very	long	what he	would	reply.	(KpV,	AA	5:30)31 In	the	second	scene	the	man	is	asked	what	he	would	do	if,	threatened by	the	same	execution,	a	prince	demanded	him	to	bear	false	witness against	an	innocent	person: But	ask	him	whether,	if	his	prince	demanded,	on	pain	of the	same	immediate	execution,	that	he	give	false	testimony	against	an	honorable	man	whom	the	prince	would	like to	destroy	under	a	plausible	pretext,	he	would	consider	it possible	to	overcome	his	love	of	life,	however	great	it	may be.	He	would	perhaps	not	venture	to	assert	whether	he would	do	it	or	not,	but	he	must	admit	without	hesitation that	it	would	be	possible	for	him.	(KpV,	AA	5:30) In	the	second	scene	we	are	considering	what	the	man	would	do	if	he took	up	a	moral	point	of	view.	We	are	-	to	speak	in	terms	of	the	chemistry	metaphor	-	adding	a	pure	determining	ground	("the	alkali") to the	man's	empirically	affected	will	("a	solution	of	calcareous	earth	in hydrochloric	acid")	in	order	to	see what	must	result.	Prior	to	this	determining	ground	it	is	likely	the	man	would	lie,	since	he	would	have something	very	important	to	gain	from	it:	his	own	life.	But	now,	if	he 31. We	must still assume the lustful	man is sensitive to considerations	of prudence.	It	is	not	difficult	for	us	to	imagine	characters	who,	in	the	grips	of	passion,	are	"in	no	mood	to	listen	to	reason"	-	as	de	Sade	describes	the	villains who	tell	Justine	that	"even	if	there	had	been	a	gallows	on	the	spot,	[she]	shall still	be	their	prey"	(Misfortunes of Virtue,	27).	In	Kant's	example,	we	need	not conjecture	very	long	what	the	lustful	man	will	say,	assuming	that	he	is	(unlike de	Sade's	villains)	listening	to	reason. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) is	offered	gain,	that	is,	great	gifts	or	high	rank;	he	rejects them.	This	will	produce	mere	approval	and	applause	in the	listener's	soul,	because	it	is	gain.	Now	threats	of	loss begin. Among these calumniators are his best friends, who	now	refuse	him	their	friendship;	close	relatives,	who threaten	to	disinherit	him	(he	is	not	wealthy);	powerful people,	who	can	pursue	and	hurt	him in	all	places	and circumstances;	a	prince	who threatens	him	with loss	of freedom	and	even	of	life	itself.	But,	so	that	the	measure of	suffering	may	be	full	and	he	may	also	feel	the	pain	that only	a	morally	good	heart	can	feel	very	deeply,	represent his	family	[...]	as	imploring him to yield and	himself,	though upright,	yet	with	a	heart	not	hard	or	insensible	either	to compassion	or	to	his	own	distress;	represent	him	at	a	moment	when	he	wishes	that	he	had	never	lived	to	see	the day that exposed	him to such	unutterable	pain	and	yet remains	firm	in	his	resolution	to	be	truthful,	without	wavering	or	even	doubting.	(KpV,	AA	5:156) At	this	point,	Kant	concludes, my	young	listener	will	be	raised	step	by	step	from	mere approval to	admiration, from	that	to	amazement,	and	finally	to	the	greatest	veneration	and	a	lively	wish	that	he himself	could	be	such	a	man	(though	certainly	not	in	such circumstances);	and	yet	virtue	is	here	worth	so	much	only because	it	costs	so	much,	not	because	it	brings	any	profit. (KpV,	AA	5:156;	cf.	GMS,	AA	4:411n) From	what	Kant	portrays	here, it is	clear that	we	can	engage	with	a story	like	this	on	both	cognitive	and	affective	levels.	As	the	story	progresses,	the	young	listener	is	led	to	cultivate	his	judgment,	eventually distinguishing	in	the	honest	man's	resolution	nothing	but	pure	duty, separated	from	any	motive	that	would	implore	him,	like	his	family,	to long,	complex	strategy	of	proof.	The	Tatsache	of	moral	consciousness shows	that	reason	can	be	practical	of	itself,	and	"all	subtle	reasoning against	the	possibility	of	its	being	practical	is	futile"	(KpV,	AA	5:3). 4.2. Spectator and Experiment Before	moving forward, there is an	apparent inconsistency I should address.	Why	does	Kant	treat	the	reader	as	a	spectator in	the	experiment	from	KpV,	AA	5:30?	Does	this	mean	he	is	not	trying	to	elicit	our consciousness of the moral law from a practical, first-personal perspective?	We	could	see	this	perspective	in	the	first	Critique	when	Kant asked	us	to	remove	from	a	body	"everything	that	is	empirical	in	it	-	the color,	the	hardness	or	softness,	the	weight,	even	the	impenetrability", as	a	way	of	illustrating	the	necessity	of	space,	which	experience	cannot	teach	us.	My	contention	is	that	Kant	is	using	this	same	strategy	in the	second	Critique;	the	only	difference	is	that	he	wants	us	to	apply	it to	another	person's	point	of	view.	When	we	imagine	a	man	faced	with threats	of	execution,	for	example,	we	cannot	detect	any	empirical	motive	that	would	secretly	press	upon	him	to	refuse	the	prince.	So	the moment	he	judges	that	truthfulness	is	the	only	act	that	"maintains	in him	respect	for	his	own	person",	we	must	conclude	that	he	is	deferring authority	to	a	principle	other	than	his	own	happiness.	In	this	way	the experiment	has	a	participatory	element,	despite	the	fact that it	does not	bring	us	(the	readers)	into	the	narrative	scene. This participatory element is central to Part II of the second	Critique, titled 'Doctrine	of the	Method	of	Pure	Practical	Reason'.	Here Kant	argues	that	the	moral	law	must	have	a	more	powerful	effect	on us the	more it is isolated from incentives that	would link it (if	only covertly)	to	self-interest.	To	establish	this	controversial	thesis,	he	asks us	to	imagine	telling	the	following	story	to	a	youth	around	ten	years	of age.	The	story	centers	on	an	honest	man	"whom	someone	wants	to	induce	to	join	the	calumniators	of	an	innocent	but	otherwise	powerless person	(say,	Anne	Boleyn,	accused	by	Henry	VIII	of	England)"	(KpV, AA	5:156).	This	man,	Kant	explains, o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) by	Henrich	and	Proops,	that	Kant's	Faktum	is	best	understood	under	a legal	analogy.	A	final	objection	is	(c)	that	my	interpretation	fails	to	vindicate	Kant's	doctrine	against	a	skeptic	who	denies	our	consciousness of	the	moral	law	is	a	genuine	fact.	Let	me	address	each	in	turn. 5.1. First Objection: "Matters of Fact" in the Third Critique First, the	one	and	only	place	where	Kant	speaks	of	a	Tatsache	of	reason	-	in	§91	of	the	third	Critique	-	he	does	not	refer	to	our	consciousness	of	moral	necessity.	He	defines	matters	of fact	as	objects	of	concepts the "reality of which can be proved", adding parenthetically: "whether	through	pure	reason	or	through	experience,	and	whether	in the	first	case	through	theoretical	or	practical	data	of	reason"	(KU, AA 5:648).	What	is	surprising,	given	our	previous	discussion,	is	that	Kant goes	on	to	list	"freedom"	as	the	only	idea	we	can	list	among	the	facts: But	what is	quite remarkable, there is	even	one idea	of reason (which is in itself incapable	of any	presentation in intuition, thus incapable of theoretical proof of its possibility)	among	matters	of	fact,	and	that	is	the	idea	of freedom.	The	reality	[of	this	idea]	as	a	particular	kind	of causality	-	the	concept	of	which	would	be	excessive	from a	theoretical	point	of	view	-	can	be	established	through practical laws of pure reason, and, in accordance with these,	in	actual	deeds,	and	thus	in	experience.	-	It	is	the only	one	among	all	the	ideas	of	pure	reason	whose	object is	a	matter	of	fact.	(KU,	AA	5:648;	modified) If	we	take	this	passage	to	represent	Kant's	official	position,	it	appears we	only	have textual	grounds to	speak	of	a "fact	of freedom",	not	a "fact	of	moral	consciousness",	as	I	have	proposed.	There	is,	however,	a larger	interpretive	difficulty	at	stake	here,	for	even	within	the	second Critique	we	find	Kant	offering	conflicting	characterizations	of	the	Fact of	Reason.	While it is	usually clear that	Kant's	Faktum refers to	our consciousness	of	the	moral	law,	at	one	point	he	speaks	of	it	in	terms yield	to	the	evil	calumniators.	At	the	same	time,	the	boy	is	led	to	cultivate	his	sensibility,	first	by	admiring	the	honest	man's	courage,	and	finally	by	expressing	the	deepest	respect	for	his	actions.34	As	these	cognitive	and	affective	responses	reach	their	peak,	the	dialectic	between spectator	and	experiment	turns	inward.	For	in	the	final	stage	we	have the	boy	expressing	"a	lively	wish	that	he himself	could	be	such	a	man" (my	emphasis),	moved	by the awareness	of	his	own	capacity to act from	pure	motives.	All	of	this	suggests	that	Kant's	method	for	eliciting our	actual	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	not	only	of	philosophical value,	i. e.,	for	showing	that	pure	reason	is	practical.	When	it	enters	the mind	of	a	pupil	by	way	of	examples,	the	philosopher's	experiment	is also	a	method	of	moral	education.35 5. Objections and Replies So	far	I	have	argued	that	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	a	fact because	it	is	something	actual,	and	it	is	a	fact	of	reason	because	-	upon reflection	-	we	see	that	it	must	spring	from	a	higher	faculty	of	desire. On the reading I have offered, Kant is not treating our moral consciousness	dogmatically,	i.e.,	as	a	brute	given.	Rather,	he	is	treating	it as	something	actual,	a	matter	of	fact,	and	what	is	more,	he	is	setting	up thought	experiments	that	generate	this	fact	within	the	reader.	These points	become	clear	as	soon	as	we	read	Kant's	doctrine	through	the notion	of	a	Tatsache that	had	acquired	a	meaning	so	flexible in	Germany	-	thanks	to	Spalding	-	that	it	was	adopted	primarily	by	theologians	during	the	1770s	and	1780s.	There	are,	however,	a	few	objections that	one	could	raise	against	my	interpretation	in	this	paper.	As	I	anticipate	them,	one	could	argue	(a)	that	my	interpretation	is	inconsistent with	Kant's	usage	of 'matters	of fact' from	the	Critique of the Power of Judgment	(1790);	and	(b)	that	it	lies	in	tension	with	a	claim,	defended 34. See	also	KpV,	AA	5:158–159	for	the	example	of	Phalaris's	bull. 35. See also	MS, AA 6:483.	Most commentators overlook the connections between	Kant's	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Reason	and	his	theory	of	moral	education from	Part II	of the	second	Critique.	For	exceptions	to	this trend,	see	Budick (Kant and Milton,	esp.	Ch.	5),	Guyer	("Examples	of	Moral	Possibility",	esp.	134, 137),	and	Grenberg	(Common Moral Experience,	esp.	Ch.	9). o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) consistent	with	Kant's	overall	position	to	locate	moral	consciousness among	the	facts,	as	I	have	done.37 5.2. Second Objection: Henrich and Proops on the Legal Analogy In	a	highly	influential	essay,	Dieter	Henrich	has	argued	that	the	"entire first	Critique,	and	the	way	in	which	Kant	presents	its	theory	as	a	whole, was	thoroughly	affected	by	the	decision	to	adopt	juridical	procedures as	a	methodological	paradigm"	("Kant's	Deduction",	38).	More	recently, Ian	Proops	has	extended	Henrich's	claim	to	argue	that	the	legal	analogy,	more so than anything else, penetrates the air of	mystery surrounding	Kant's	Faktum.	On	the	basis	of	published	and	unpublished texts,	Proops	builds	what	appears	to	be	a	strong	case	for	reading	Kant's Faktum	in	terms	of	the	quid facti/quid juris	distinction	criminal	lawyers used	during	the	eighteenth	century.	What	emerges	from	this	distinction,	he	argues,	is	the	meaning	of	a	factum	as	something	that	remains "relevant	to,	but	falls	short	of,	a	final	ruling"	("Kant's	Legal	Metaphor", 215).	To	support	his	reading,	Proops	cites	various	places	in	the	second Critique	where	Kant	appeals	to	the	judgments	of	common	human	reason,	adding:	"[O]ne	doubts	that	these	'proofs'	of	the	purity	of	origin	of the	moral	law	can	be	conclusive,	but	it	is	plain	that	Kant	believes	they ought	to	have	some	probative	force	-	in	the	way,	perhaps,	that	legal evidence has defeasible, non-demonstrative force" ("Kant's Legal	Metaphor",	227;	my	emphasis).38 Now it is no	doubt true that	Kant	was	deeply influenced	by the juridical	procedures	of	his	day,	and	I think it is	useful to	emphasize 37. In	a	footnote	Kant	also	explains	that	he	is	going	beyond	the	usual	meaning of	a	Tatsache.	As	he	writes:	"Here	I	extend	the	concept	of	a	matter	of	fact,	as seems to	me right, beyond the	usual	meaning	of this	word. For	when the issue	is	the	relation	of	things	to	our	cognitive	capacities	it	is	not	necessary,	indeed	not	even	feasible,	to	restrict	this	expression	merely	to	actual	experience" (KU,	AA	5:468n;	modified). 38.	Proops	continues: "[W]hat really	matters, for	present	purposes, is the	very fact	that	Kant	envisages	such	proofs	at	all.	That	he	does	so	supports	a	view	of the	Fact	of	Reason	as	the	factum	of	the	Deduction	of	Freedom;	for	as	we	have seen,	a	factum	is	a	fact	that needs to be proved in the course of a deduction"	("Kant's Legal	Metaphor",	227;	my	emphasis). of	our	consciousness	of	freedom,	writing:	"this	fact	is	inseparably	connected	with,	and	indeed	identical	with,	consciousness	of	freedom	of the	will"	(KpV,	AA	5:42). While	a full treatment	of this topic lies	beyond the scope	of this analysis,	I	believe	a	solution	is	fairly	easy	to	sketch.	All	we	have	to	do	is coordinate	two	of	Kant's	well-known	claims	in	the	second	Critique:	the reciprocity	thesis	and	the	disclosure	thesis.36	According	to	the	former, freedom	and	morality	are	analytically linked,	because	when	we	examine	one	concept	we	are	led	directly	to	the	other,	and	vice versa (KpV, AA	5:29).	According	to	the	latter,	it	is	only	through	our	consciousness of the moral law	-	as a law that commands without empirical motives	-	that	we	acquire	a	positive idea	of	our freedom.	As	Kant	puts it,	"had	not	the	moral	law	already been	distinctly	thought	in	our	reason, we	should	never	consider	ourselves	justified	in	assuming such	a	thing as	freedom	(even	though	it	is	not	self-contradictory)"	(KpV,	AA	5:5n), and	elsewhere:	"this	law	is	the	only	law	that	makes	us	conscious	of	the independence	of	our	power	of	choice	from	determination	by	all	other incentives	(of	our	freedom)"	(RGV,	AA	6:26n). With	these	distinctions	in	place,	we	can	return	to	§91	with	a	new perspective.	On	a	second	look	it	is	clear	that	Kant	has	the	disclosure thesis in	mind	when he says freedom "can be established through practical laws	of	pure reason" (KU,	AA	5:648).	We	can then	qualify Kant's	statement from	the	third	Critique in the following	way:	Strictly speaking,	morality and freedom are one and the same from the viewpoint	of	the	reciprocity	thesis,	but	different	from	the	viewpoint of	the	disclosure	thesis.	That	is	to	say,	the	Faktum/Tatsache	of	moral consciousness	has	epistemic	priority	over	the	Faktum/Tatsache	of	freedom,	because it is	only through the	moral law's	necessity (as	a law that	commands	"completely	a	priori")	that	we	first	become	aware	of the	independence	of	our	power	of	choice.	Qualified	in	this	way,	it	is 36. 'Reciprocity thesis' is	Allison's	phrase (Kant's Theory of Freedom); 'disclosure thesis'	is	my	own. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) and	natural	science	illustrate	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition, judgments	from	common	human	reason	illustrate	the	reality	of	moral consciousness	-	elevating	both	to	facts	that	neither	admit	nor	require further	proof. 6. A Final Objection: Skepticism About Moral Consciousness As	I	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper,	many	commentators	in	Kant's day and our own have found the second	Critique disappointing because the book's argument begins where they think it should end: with	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law.	If	this	alleged	"fact"	provides the	only	basis	for	inferring	that	pure	reason	is	practical,	it	appears	the scope	of	Kant's	position	is	severely	limited.	It	will	not	persuade	a	skeptic,	for	example,	who	is	already	convinced	that	reason	is	conditioned by	empirical	motives	all	the	way	down.	Here	it	seems	all	the	skeptic has	to	do	in	order	to	refute	the	argument	of	the	second	Critique	is	deny what	Kant	treats	as	a	fact,	i. e.,	our	consciousness	of	an	absolute	practical	law.	A	skeptic	could	reply	that,	when	reflecting	upon	the	contents of	his	consciousness,	he is	only	aware	of	hypothetical	or	prudential imperatives	-	nothing	that	would	commit	him	to	affirm	a	higher	faculty	of	desire.	How	should	we	reply	to	this	line	of	criticism? First of all,	Kant is ready to admit that our consciousness of the moral	law	is	"strange"	(befremdlich),	for	there	is	nothing	like	it	in	our entire field of practical cognition.	When	we attend to the necessity of	the	moral	law,	we	are	led	to	see	that	it	wholly	excludes	empirical motives from entering into our	maxims.	No other principle	-	hypothetical or prudential	-	has this unconditional character. For Kant, however,	skepticism	about	the	reality	of	moral	consciousness	can	only arise	from	a	certain	standpoint:	the	standpoint	of	abstract	speculation. Indeed,	Kant	makes	this	clear	in	the	second	Critique	when	he	says	that only	philosophers can	make the question of pure	morality "doubtful" (zweifelhaft) (KpV,	AA	5:155). In	another	work	he tells	us	why:	Only those	"who	are	accustomed	merely	to	explanations	by	natural	sciences	will	not	get	into	their	heads	the	categorical	imperative	from	which these laws proceed dictatorially, even though they feel themselves this	as	Henrich	and	Proops	have.	But	at	the	level	of	details,	Proops's	attempt	to	read	such	procedures	into	the	second	Critique	runs	up	against major	difficulties.	For	instance,	if	we	interpret	Kant's	Faktum	solely	in terms	of	an	analogy	to	eighteenth-century	criminal	law,	we	are	forced to	demote	the	status	of	moral	consciousness to	something	allegedly the	case,	so	as	to	make	Kant's	Faktum	fit	the	idea	of	legal	evidence	bearing	"defeasible,	non-demonstrative	force".	To	do	so,	however,	is	completely	at	odds	with	the	text	and	spirit	of	the	second	Critique,	where Kant	repeatedly	affirms	that	the	moral	law	is	"apodictically	certain"	and "firmly	established	of	itself"	(KpV,	AA	5:47).	By	contrast,	the	notion	of	a scientific	fact	that	emerged	with	the	British	experimentalists	puts	this epistemic	ultimacy	in	its	proper	light.	For	writers	like	Boyle,	matters	of fact	were	elevated	from	the	category	of	things	allegedly done,	and	so	capable	of	proof,	to	that	of	things	actually the case,	and	so	demanding	no proof.	On	the	whole,	this	makes	the	scientific	analogy	I	have	uncovered	a	better	tool	than	the	legal	analogy	for	interpreting	Kant's	Faktum. The	scientific	analogy	also illuminates	Kant's strategy	of justification	within	his	critical	philosophy	at large.39	When	Kant	claims that our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	requires	no	proof,	we	need	only recall	that	a	year	earlier	he	had	used	this	language	in	his	theoretical philosophy, stating that "we can content ourselves	with having displayed	[dargelegt] the	pure	use	of	our	cognitive	faculty	as	a fact	[den reinen Gebrauch unseres Erkenntnivermgens als Tatsache]"	(B5).	As	I	have shown,	there	is	a	continuity	in	the	argument-structure	of	these	texts. By attending to the epistemic	necessity in the concept	of space, for example,	we	can	see	that	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	(rather	than	an empirically conditioned) faculty of intuition. Likewise, by attending to	the	deliberative	necessity	in	the	moral	law,	we	can	see	that	it	must spring from a pure (rather than an empirically conditioned) faculty of	desire.	Finally, in the same	way that	examples from	mathematics 39.	For	instance,	much	of	what	I	am	saying	about	Kant's	strategy	of	justification in	the	second	Critique	resonates	with	Ameriks's	reading	of	the	transcendental deduction	in	the	first	Critique.	See	his	"Kant's	Transcendental	Deduction	as a	Regressive	Argument". Limits of space	prevent	me from	exploring these similarities	further. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) separate	duty	from	happiness,	and	acknowledge	the	former's	authority,	is	evident	by	experiment,	even	if	not	known	by	deduction.	However	strange	our	moral	consciousness	may	be	from	the	standpoint	of speculation, it is	a fact	we	can	grasp from	a	practical	point	of	view. For	Kant,	then,	it	is	only	when	we	guide	ourselves	by	this	fact,	and	do so	as philosophers,	that	we	can	finally	reconcile	in	our	heads	what	we already	know	in	our	hearts.40 Abbreviations In	the	case	of	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	I	follow	the	standard	practice of	referring	to	the	1781	(A)	and	1787	(B)	editions.	For	all	other	texts,	citations	appear	in	the	order	of	abbreviation,	volume	number,	and	page number from the	Akademie Ausgabe (AA),	Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Königlich Preussische akademie der Wissenschaften (29 vols. Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	1902-).	All	translations	come	from	The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,	edited	by	Paul	Guyer	and	Allen W.	Wood	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992-).	Where	I depart	from	them,	I	add	'modified'	after	the	in-text	citation. GMS Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten	(AA	4),	Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,	trans.	Mary	Gregor. KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (AA 5),	Critique of Practical Reason,	trans.	Mary	Gregor. KU Kritik der Urteilskraft	(AA	5),	Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans.	Paul	Guyer	and	Eric	Matthews. 40.	The ideas that led to this paper	were a result of conversations I had	with Paul	Franks	while	I	was	a	graduate	student	at	the	University	of	Toronto.	This publication	is	in	many	ways	indebted	to	his	inspiring	approach	to	the	history of	philosophy.	More	recently,	a	number	of	individuals	have	offered	me	helpful	feedback	on	earlier	drafts.	Many	thanks	to	Karl	Ameriks,	Anthony	Bruno, Robert	Clewis,	Ben	Crowe,	Robert	Hanna,	Dai	Heide,	Michelle	Kosch,	Lara Ostaric,	Evan	Tiffany,	Leah	Ware,	Benjamin	Yost,	Ariel	Zylberman,	and	two anonymous	reviewers	for	this	journal.	I	also	owe	a	special	debt	of	gratitude to	Kristin	Gjesdal	for	reading	multiple	drafts	of	this	paper,	and	for	expressing enthusiasm	in	my	project	from	the	beginning. compelled irresistibly	by it" (MS,	AA	6:378). In this	way skepticism about	moral	consciousness	can	only	arise	for	those	who	seek	to	defend the	"omnipotence	of	theoretical	reason"	(MS,	AA	6:378).	Although	our cognition	of the	moral law is "distinct" and "irrepressible", such	philosophers	will	nevertheless	try	to	"shut	their	ears"	to	it	for	the	sake	of protecting	their	speculative	interests	(KpV,	AA	5:35). Kant	distills	this	point	in	his	1793	essay	"On	the	Common	Saying: That	May	Be	Correct	in	Theory,	but	it	is	of	No	Use	in	Practice".	Here we find him responding to Christian	Garve's confession	-	from his 1792	Essays	-	that	he	readily	grasps	the	separation	between	duty	and happiness	in	his	head,	but	loses	it	entirely	in	the	strivings	of	his	heart. In	reply	Kant	writes	with	a	note	of	humor	that	he	feels	no	hesitation in	contradicting	Garve	and	"championing	his	heart	against	his	head" (TP,	AA	8:285).	As	a	man	of	integrity,	Kant	adds,	Garve	has	"actually found this	separation	in	his	heart	every	time	(in	his	determination	of will),	only	it	would	not	be	reconciled	in	his	head"	(TP,	AA	8:285).	In other	words,	Garve	is	unable	to	reconcile	the	"possibility	of	categorical imperatives	(such	as	those	of	duty	are)"	with	what	Kant	calls	the	principles	of psychological	explanation,	"all	of	which	have	the	mechanism of	natural	necessity	as	their	basis"	(TP,	AA	8:285).	It	is	only	from	the standpoint	of	theory,	then,	that	Garve	can	find	obscure	what	he	knows clearly	and	distinctly	from	the	standpoint	of	practice. This	is	the	critical	part	of	the	reply	I	imagine	Kant	would	have	us give	to	the	skeptic.	We	must	show	that	the	skeptic's	demand	to	verify the Fact of	Reason	with further	proof is unfounded. It rests on the mistaken conviction that all facts, including facts of consciousness, must	conform	to theoretical	standards	of	explanation	("all	of	which have	the	mechanism	of	natural	necessity	as	their	basis").	From	what Kant says,	however, there is	also	a constructive reply	we	can	bring forth,	and	this	may	be	the	deeper	lesson	of	his	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of Reason.	If	we	are	to	cease	defending	the	omnipotence	of	theoretical reason,	we	must	learn	to	philosophize	in	a	different	way,	and	I	take it	this	is	what	Kant	would	have	us	do	by	adopting	a	method	"similar to that of chemistry" (KpV, AA 5:163). The	way people immediately o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) -	Kant's Theory of Mind.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000.	[Kant's Theory of Mind] -	"Kant's	Transcendental	Deduction	as	a	Regressive	Argument".	In	Interpreting Kant's Critiques.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003. -	"Is	Practical	Justification	in	Kant	Ultimately	Dogmatic?"	In	Kant's Elliptical Path.	Oxford:	Oxford	University,	2012.	["Practical	Justification"] Austin,	John	L.	"Unfair	to	Facts".	In	Philosophical Papers,	edited	by	James O.	Urmson	and	Geoffrey	Warnock.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1961. Bacon,	Francis.	The Advancement of Learning.	In	The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, edited by James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis, and Douglas	D.	Heath.	London,	14	vols,	1857–74. Beck,	Lewis	White.	A Commentary on Kant's Critique	of	Practical	Reason.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1960.	[Commentary] Boyle,	Robert.	"A	Proëmial	Essay,	wherein,	with	some	Considerations touching	Experimental	Essays	in	General	[...].	"	In	The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle. In Six Volumes. To Which Is Prefixed the Life of the Author,	edited	by	Thomas	Birch.	London:	J.	and	F.	Rivington, 1772.	Cited	by	volume	and	page	number.	["A	Proëmial	Essay"] Brandt,	Reinhardt.	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant.	Hamburg:	F. Meiner,	2007. Budick,	Sanford.	Kant and Milton.	Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University Press,	2010 Butler,	Joseph.	The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed,	in	The Works of Joseph Butler,	edited	by	William	E.	Gladstone.	Oxford:	Clarendon Press,	1896.	Cited	by	volume,	section,	and	page	number.	[A] Cohen,	Hermann.	Kants Begründung der Ethik.	Berlin:	Dümmler, 1877. [Kants Begründung] Dear, Peter. "Jesuit	Mathematical Science and the	Reconstitution of Experience	in	the	Early	Seventeenth	Century",	Studies In History and Philosophy of Science	18	(1987):	133–175. de	Sade,	Marquis.	The Misfortunes of Virtue and Other Early Tales,	trans. David	Coward.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999.	[Misfortunes of Virtue] MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten	(AA	6),	Metaphysics of Morals,	trans. Mary	Gregor. Progress Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (AA	20),	What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?	trans.	Peter	Heath. Prol Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (AA	4),	Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science,	trans.	Gary	Hatfield. Refl Reflexionen [cited	by	number],	Notes and Fragments, trans. Curtis	Bowman,	Paul	Guyer,	and	Frederick	Rauscher. RGV Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft	(AA	6), Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,	trans.	George di	Giovanni. TP "Über	den	Gemeinspruch:	Das	mag	in	der	Theorie	richtig sein,	taugt	aber	nicht	für	die	Praxis"	(AA	8),	"On	the	Common	Saying:	That	May	Be	Correct	in	Theory,	but	it	is	of	No Use	in	Practice",	trans.	Mary	Gregor. ÜGTP "Über den	Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie"	(AA	8),	"On	the	Use	of	Teleological	Principles in	Philosophy",	trans.	Günter	Zöller. References Allison,	Henry.	Kant's Theory of Freedom.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990. -	Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (Revised and Enlarged Edition). New	Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. [Kant's Transcendental Idealism] Ameriks,	Karl.	"Kant's	Deduction	of	Freedom	and	Morality",	Journal of the History of Philosophy	19	(1981):	53–79. o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) Metaphysics	of	Morals: A Critical Guide,	edited	by	J.	Timmermann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. ["Problems with Freedom"] -	"Examples	of	Moral	Possibility".	In	Kant and Education,	edited	by	Klas Roth	and	Chris	W.	Surprenant.	New	York:	Routledge,	2012. Henrich, Dieter.	"Der	Begriff	der	sittlichen	Einsicht	und	Kants	Lehre vom	Faktum	der	Vernunft".	In	Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken. Festschrift für Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 60. Geburtstag,	edited by	D.	Henrich,	W.	Schulz,	and	K.-H.	Volkmann-Schluck.	Tübingen: Mohr	Siebeck,	1960.	["Faktum	der	Vernunft"] -	"Kant's	Notion	of	a	Deduction	and	the	Methodological	Background of the	First	Critique". In	Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus	Postumum,	edited	by	Eckart	Förster.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1989.	["Kant's	Deduction"] Johnston,	David.	"The	Natural	History	of	Fact", Australasian Journal of Philosophy	82	(2004):	275–291. Kain, Patrick. "Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second Critique", Philosophy Compass 5 (2006): 449–465. ["Realism and Anti-Realism"] -	"Practical	Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of	Reason". In	Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality,	edited	by	Benjamin	Lipscomb	and	James	Krueger.	Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	2010. Keller,	Pierre.	"Two	Conceptions	of	Compatibilism	in	the	Critical	Elucidation".	In	Kant's Critique	of	Practical	Reason: A Critical Guide,	edited by	Jens	Timmermann	and	Andrews	Reath,	Cambridge:	Cambridge University	Press,	2010.	["Two	Conceptions	of	Compatibilism"] Kleingeld,	Pauline.	"Moral	Consciousness	and	the	'Fact	of	Reason."'	In Kant's Critique	of	Practical	Reason: A Critical Guide,	edited	by	Jens Timmermann	and	Andrews	Reath,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010.	["Moral	Consciousness"] Korsgaard,	Christine.	"Morality	as	Freedom".	In	Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered, edited	by	Yirmiyahu	Yovel.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer Academic,	1989. di Giovanni, George. Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind, 1774–1800.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005.	[Freedom and Religion] -	"The	Year	1786	and	Die Bestimmung des Menschen,	or	Popularphilosophie in	Crisis",	Studies in German Idealism 13	(2011)	217–234.	["The Year	1786"] Engstrom,	Stephen.	"Introduction".	In	Critique of Practical Reason,	trans. Werner	Pluhar.	Indianapolis:	Hackett,	2002. "Fact, n".	OED	Online.	Oxford	University	Press. Franks,	Paul	W.	"Transcendental	Arguments,	Reason,	and	Skepticism: Contemporary	Debates	and	the	Origins	of	Post-Kantian	Idealism". In Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects,	edited	by	Robert	Stern.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000.	["Transcendental	Arguments,	Reason,	and	Skepticism"] -	All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism.	Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University	Press, 2005.	[All or Nothing] -	"Ancient	Skepticism,	Modern	Naturalism,	and	Nihilism	in	Hegel's Early	Jena	Writings".	In	The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy,	edited	by	Frederick	Beiser.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	2008.	["Skepticism,	Naturalism,	and Nihilism"] Garve,	Christian.	Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral, der Litteratur und dem Gesselschaftlichen Leben	(vol.	1).	Breslau,	1792. [Essays] Grenberg, Jeanine.	Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.	[Common Moral Experience] Guyer,	Paul.	"Naturalistic	and	Transcendental	Moments	in	Kant's	Moral	Philosophy",	Inquiry	50	(2007):	444–464.	["Naturalistic	and	Transcendental	Moments"] -	"Problems with Freedom: Kant's Argument in	Groundwork III and its Subsequent Emendations". In Kant's Groundwork of the o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) der Herzoglichen Bibliothek zu Wolfenbüttel gemachte neuere Einwendungen vertheidiget.	Braunschweig:	Verlag	der	Fürstl, 1777. [Geschichte Jesu Christi] Rohden,	Valerio.	"An	Experiment	with	Practical	Reason".	In Kant in Brazil,	edited	by	Frederick	Rauscher	and	Daniel	O.	Perez.	Rochester: University	of	Rochester	Press,	2012. Russell,	Paul.	"Butler's	'Future	State'	and	Hume's	'Guide	to	Life"', Journal of the History of Philosophy	42	(2004):	425–448. Schopenhauer,	Arthur.	Über die Grundlage der Moral,	in	Sämtliche Werke, edited	by	Wolfgang	von	Löhneysen.	Frankfurt/Main:	Cotta, 1960. Cited	by	volume	and	page	number.	[Grundlage] Serjeantson,	Richard.	"Testimony	and	Proof	in	Early-Modern	England", Studies In History and Philosophy of Science	30	(1999):	195–236. -	"Proof	and	Persuasion".	In	The Cambridge History of Science Vol. 3: Early Modern Science, edited	by	Katharine	Park and	Lorraine	Daston. Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006. Shapin, Steven. "Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle's Literary Technology",	Social Studies of Science 14 (1984): 481–520. ["Boyle's Literary	Technology"] Shapin, Steven, and Schaffer, Simon. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and Experimental Life.	Princeton:	Princeton	University Press,	1985. Shapiro,	Barbara.	"The	Concept	'Fact':	Legal	Origins	and	Cultural	Diffusion",	Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies	26 (1994):	227–252.	["The	Concept	'Fact"'] -	A Culture of Fact: England, 1550–1720.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press, 2000.	[Culture of Fact] -	"Testimony	in	Seventeenth-Century	English	Natural	Philosophy:	Legal	Origins	and	Early	Development",	Studies In History and Philosophy of Science	33	(2002):	243–263.	["Testimony"] Schönecker, Dieter. "Kant's	Moral Intuitionism: The Fact of Reason and	Moral	Predispositions'', Kant Studies Online	(2013):	1–38. Lavater,	Johann	Kaspar.	Geheimes Tagebuch von einem Beobachter seiner selbst.	Leipzig,	2	vols,	1772–1773. Locke,	John.	An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,	edited	by	P.	H. Nidditch.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press, 1975.	Cited	by	book, chapter, and	section	number.	[E] Łuków,	Paweł.	"The	Fact	of	Reason:	Kant's	Passage	to	Ordinary	Moral Knowledge".	Kant-Studien 84 (1993): 204–221. ["Kant's	Passage to Ordinary	Moral	Knowledge"] Mendelssohn,	Moses. Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum. Berlin:	Friedrich	Maurer,	1783.	Cited	by	section	and	page	number.	[J] Moyar, Dean. "Unstable Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant's	Moral	Philosophy".	Journal of Moral Philosophy	5	(2008):	327– 360.	["Unstable	Autonomy"] Munzel, Felicitas.	Kant's Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012. [Kant's Conception of Pedagogy] Printy,	Michael. "The	Determination	of	Man: Johann Joachim	Spalding	and	the	Protestant	Enlightenment",	Journal of the History of Ideas 74	(2013):	189–212.	["Spalding	and	the	Protestant	Enlightenment"] Proops, Ian. "Kant's	Legal	Metaphor	and	the	Nature	of	a	Deduction", Journal of the History of Philosophy 41	(2003):	209–229.	["Kant's	Legal Metaphor"] Rauscher,	Frederick.	"Kant's	Moral	Anti-Realism",	Journal of the History of Philosophy	40	(2002):	477–499. Rawls, John. "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy". In Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus	Postumum, edited by Eckart Förster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.	-	Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy.	Cambridge	MA: Harvard	University	Press,	2000. Reinhold,	Karl.	Beyträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts.	Hamburg:	Friedrich	Pertres, 1801–1803.	[Beyträge] Ress,	Johann	Heinrich.	Die Auferstehungsgeschichte Jesu Christi gegen einige im vierten Beytrage zur Geschichte und Litteratur aus den Schätzen o en re Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason philosophers'	imprint – 21 – vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014) Spalding, Johann Joachim. Die Bestimmung des Menschen [First published in 1748], edited W.E. Müller. Waltrop: Hartmut Spenner, 1997.	[Bestimmung] Starck,	Johann	August.	Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche des Ersten Jahrhunderts.	Berlin	and	Leipzig,	3	vols,	1779. Sussman,	David.	"From	Deduction	to	Deed:	Kant's	Grounding	of	the Moral	Law",	Kantian Review	13	(2008):	52–81.	["Kant's	Grounding	of the	Moral	Law"] Tenenbaum, Sergio. "The Idea of Freedom and	Moral Cognition in Groundwork	III",	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	84	(2012): 555–589. Timmermann, Jens. "Reversal or	Retreat?	Kant's	Deductions of Freedom	and	Morality". In	Kant's Critique	of	Practical	Reason: A Critical Guide,	edited	by	Jens	Timmermann	and	Andrews	Reath,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010.	["Reversal	or	Retreat?"] Tippmann,	Caroline.	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Johann Joachim Spalding.	Leipzig:	Evangelische	Verlagsanstalt,	2011. Vanzo, Alberto. "Kant on Experiment". In Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne, edited	by James	Maclaurin.	Dordrecht: Springer,	2012. Ware,	Owen.	"Accessing	the	Moral	Law	Through	Feeling".	Kantian Review,	forthcoming. Willaschek,	Marcus.	"Die	Tat	der	Vernunft:	Zur	Bedeutung	der	Kantischen	These	vom	'Factum	der	Vernunft"'.	In	Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses,	edited	by	G.	Funke.	Bonn:	Bouvier,	1991. ["Die	Tat	der	Vernunft"] Wood, Allen W. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,	2008. -	"Preface	and	Introduction	(3–16)".	In	Immanuel Kant: Kritik	der	praktischen	Vernunft,	edited	by	O.	Höffe.	Berlin:	Akademie	Verlag,	2011. Zammito,	John	H.	Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology.	Chicago: University	of	Chicago	Press,	2002.